Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency by García Lara, Juan Manuel et al.
This is a postprint version of the following published document: 
García, J. M., García, B., & Penalva, F. (2015). 
Accounting conservatism and firm investment 
efficiency. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 61 (1), pp. 221-238.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.07.003 
© Elsevier, 2015
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 
Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency$
Juan Manuel García Lara a, Beatriz García Osma a,b, Fernando Penalva c,nPr
☆We
Dargeni
Accoun
Accoun
Autónom
We ack
Ramón
n Corr
E-ma Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain
b Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
c IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Av. Pearson, 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spaina b s t r a c t
We argue that conservatism improves investment efficiency. In particular, we predict that
it resolves debt equity conflicts, facilitating a firm's access to debt financing and limiting
underinvestment. This permits the financing of prudent investments that otherwise might
not be pursued. Our empirical results confirm these predictions. We find that moreymmet
firms
e effec
. We a
que inKeywords: Conservatism, Earnings as
conservative
and that thes
asymmetries
even for opaior research (e.g. Biddle et al., 2009
appreciate the helpful comments and sugge
dou, Stephen Hillegeist, Felix Lamp, Kevin M
ting Association, 2009 Annual Meeting of
ting, IE Business School, the Katholieke Univ
a de Barcelona, Tilburg University, Stockhol
nowledge financial assistance from the Span
Areces, and the AECA Chair in Accounting a
esponding author. Tel.: þ34 93 253 4200; f
ail address: penalva@iese.edu (F. Penalva).ric timeliness, Investment efficiency, Under-investment, Over-investment.
invest more and issue more debt in settings prone to underinvestment
ts are more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information
lso find that conservatism is associated with reduced overinvestment,
vestments such as research and development.1. Introduction) hypothesizes and finds that accounting quality improves investment efficiency.
They identify a conditional negative (positive) association between accounting quality and investment for firms operating in
settings prone to overinvestment (underinvestment). We extend this line of research, similarly hypothesizing and finding a
conditional negative (positive) association between conservatism and investment for firms operating in settings prone to
overinvestment (underinvestment). We also find that more conservative firms in settings prone to underinvestment issue
more debt and invest in more prudent projects, and that the investment and financing effects of conservatism are more
pronounced in the presence of greater information asymmetries.stions from John Core (the editor), Sugata Roychowdhury and Rodrigo Verdi (the referees), Christina
elendrez, Gonzalo Rodriguez, and seminar participants at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the European
the American Accounting Association, the Seventh Workshop on Empirical Research in Financial
ersiteit Leuven, Universidad de Barcelona, Universidad de Murcia, University of Exeter, Universidad
m School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, University of Bristol and London School of Economics.
ish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (ECO2013-48328 and ECO2010-19314), the Fundación
nd Auditing.
ax: þ34 93 253 4343.
1
Accounting conservatism imposes more stringent verifiability requirements for the recognition of economic gains
relative to losses (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003). This results in earnings that capture difficult to verify economic losses more
quickly than gains and generates a downward bias in the value of net assets. The literature shows that conservatism
improves investment efficiency by reducing managerial overinvestment (Francis and Martin, 2010; Bushman et al., 2011).
We explore the related issue of when conservatism can increase investment in situations where firms are more prone to
underinvestment.
Prior research provides evidence that conservatism (1) discourages managerial selection of projects with negative net
present value (NPV) and triggers the early abandonment of poorly performing projects (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar,
2005) and (2) creates incentives to discard positive NPV but high risk projects (Leuz, 2001; Roychowdhury, 2010; Bushman
et al., 2011).
We predict that conservatism also mitigates underinvestment among firms facing financing difficulties. These firms
likely suffer from related problems such as the risk of insolvency and low profitability. For them, the costs associated with
negative NPV investments or overly risky positive NPV investments are high. Both debt and equityholders are reluctant
to grant new capital to such firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Conservatism can help to alleviate agency
problems and thus mitigate financing constraints for these firms.
Investors likely fear that financially constrained firms may tumble into insolvency if their projects fail. In these situations,
we expect conservative accounting to facilitate access to additional debt for new investments, as it encourages prudent
investments that can increase firm value without exacerbating financial risk. In contrast, conservatism is less likely to
alleviate shareholders' reluctance to provide additional financing. Dispersed shareholders are less capable of ensuring that
firms maintain conservative accounting policies and undertake prudent investments. Furthermore, shareholders, when they
provide financing, may prefer risky projects that can transfer wealth to them from debtholders. Conservative reporting
discourages managers from engaging in this kind of conduct because of the timely recognition of losses. Overall, these
arguments lead to the prediction that conservatism facilitates additional debt for financially constrained firms seeking to
invest but does not necessarily facilitate their access to additional equity.
We also expect conservatism to help to limit overinvestment problems. Overinvestment is likely to pervade firms that
have a high investment capacity. In these firms, managers are more able to pursue projects that have a negative NPV but
generate private benefits for them. Conservatism, by imposing timely reporting of losses, makes such self interested
decisions apparent sooner, enabling stakeholders to discipline managers, if necessary, and deterring such conduct in the
future. We predict these roles of conservatism hold not only for acquisitions, as illustrated by Francis and Martin (2010), but
also for more opaque investments such as capital expenditures and research and development (R&D).1
Finally, we predict that conservatism affects differently future profitability and its volatility depending on whether the
firm is in a setting prone to over or underinvestment. In settings prone to overinvestment (i.e., in firms with a high
investment capacity), conservatism leads to better project selection and earlier abandonment of loss making projects,
increasing the future return on assets (ROA). However, this may not always be true in firms prone to underinvestment (i.e.,
those with a low investment capacity). For these firms, conservatism instead facilitates the access to additional funding,
particularly for low risk and less volatile projects that do not necessarily generate a higher rate of return than existing ones.
Using a large US sample for the period 1990 2007, we follow the method of Biddle et al. (2009) and test these
predictions on the association between accounting conservatism and firm investment, financing, and performance. In our
main tests, we use the firm level measure of conservative reporting timely loss recognition proposed by Khan and Watts
(2009). Our results are robust to the use of alternative proxies based on Callen et al. (2010) and Givoly and Hayn (2000). We
incorporate in our tests measures of financial reporting quality to ensure that we isolate the incremental economic
consequences of conservatism. The analysis yields several key findings.
First, more conservative firms invest more and issue more debt than less conservative ones in settings where
underinvestment is more likely. We also show that conservatism is associated with lower overinvestment not only for
acquisitions but also for more opaque investments, such as capital expenditures and R&D. Finally, we show that the
association between conservatism and accounting profitability, as measured by the future ROA, is conditional on whether
the firm is prone to over or underinvestment. For firms prone to overinvestment, conservatism is associated with a higher
ROA. However, for firms prone to underinvestment, conservatism is associated with less volatile investments that do not
necessarily lead to a higher ROA.
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we extend the growing literature on the links between
accounting quality and investment efficiency.2 We show that, among firms prone to underinvest, those with more
conservative accounting invest more (in less profitable but more prudent projects) and issue more debt. This suggests that
conservatism encourages low risk, positive NPV investments and that these new investments are financed with new debt.
This is consistent with conservatism limiting debt equity conflicts. Our finding that conservatism mitigates1 Acquisitions are highly visible investments where moral hazard can be monitored more easily than in the case of capital expenditures or R&D. With
acquisitions, outside parties have access to the financial statements of the acquired firm and other information sources. However, for outsiders it is more
difficult to assess whether investments in capex and R&D are efficient (Aboody and Lev, 2000). We refer to these investments as being relatively more
“opaque” than acquisitions.
2 See, among others, Bens and Monahan (2004), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Hope and Thomas (2008), McNichols and Stubben (2008), Biddle et al.
(2009), Beatty et al. (2010), and Cheng et al. (2013).
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underinvestment in financially constrained firms is novel, as prior research focuses only on the role of conservatism in
reducing overinvestment (Francis and Martin, 2010; Bushman et al., 2011).
We also contribute to the stream of literature on the links between accounting quality and financing (e.g., Balakrishnan
et al., 2014). Prior work shows that conservatism can lead to a lower cost of debt (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang 2008;
Wittenberg Moerman, 2008). We provide evidence of an association between conservatism and new debt issuances for
financially constrained firms. This finding complements the related analytical evidence provided by Göx and Wagenhofer
(2009), who show that conditional conservatism is the optimal accounting policy for financially constrained firms seeking to
issue debt. Our evidence also complements the work of Beatty et al. (2010). Their work on the role accounting quality in
facilitating investment focuses on access to private versus public debt. We examine debt versus equity.
We also expand the evidence on the role of conservatism in mitigating the overinvestment problems documented
in Francis and Martin (2010). We show that conservatism, in overinvestment scenarios, is also associated with
reduced investment in more opaque investments, such as R&D and capital expenditures, where outsider monitoring is
less likely to affect investment outcomes. We also add to their findings by showing that the investment related effects
of conservatism affect performance differently depending on whether the firm is over or underinvesting. While prior
research finds that the investment effects of improved accounting quality lead to greater profitability (Hope and
Thomas, 2008; Francis and Martin, 2010), we find that this is true only in settings prone to overinvestment. In settings
prone to underinvestment, conservatism is associated with investment in prudent projects and therefore does not
lead to a higher ROA.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the expected association between conservatism
and investment and financing. Section 3 contains the research design. Section 4 describes the sample and discusses the
main empirical results. Sections 5 and 6 contain additional analyses and robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Conservatism, investment and ﬁnancing: development of hypotheses
Wemake two major predictions: (1) conservatism is associated with increased investment in firms prone to underinvest,
and (2) conservatism reduces overinvestment problems in firms prone to overinvest. These predictions lead to two further
hypotheses about the role of debt and equityholders in alleviating investment constraints.
Our study builds on the literature linking financing and investment decisions. In their seminal work, Modigliani and
Miller (1958) argue that financing and investment decisions are separate in perfect capital markets. However, a large stream
of literature subsequently shows that information frictions drive linkages between financing and investment decisions
(Myers, 1977, 1984; Childs et al., 2005). In line with this literature and similar to the work of Balakrishnan et al. (2014), we
assume that information frictions can affect financing and investment and that financial reporting can help to decrease
these frictions.
Biddle et al. (2009) argue that firms constrained in their ability to make new investments are probably characterized by
having low cash balances and high leverage. These firms might even suffer from such related problems as low profitability
and the risk of insolvency. Both debt and equityholders are unlikely to finance these firms, as the costs associated with
negative NPV projects or with positive NPV but high risk investments are high, particularly when information asymmetry
is also high. We predict that conservative reporting can mitigate these constraints. By imposing timely loss recognition and
delayed gain recognition, conservatism makes poor investment decisions apparent in earnings sooner. This lowers
managerial incentives to invest in negative NPV projects and prompts the early abandonment of poorly performing
projects (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Thus conservatism enables a firm's stakeholders to discipline managers, if
necessary and encourages managers to avoid high risk projects and select more prudent ones (Roychowdhury, 2010;
Bushman et al., 2011).
For financially constrained firms, conservative reporting signals that managers will likely engage in low risk, positive
NPV projects (which we designate as “prudent investments”). We predict that this, in turn, will facilitate a firm's access to
capital. Even for these prudent investments, without conservative reporting, we expect firms operating in settings prone to
underinvestment to be unlikely to gain access to capital.
In contrast, for firms prone to overinvest, conservatism lowers investment. In these firms, managers are more
likely to pursue negative NPV investments, such as pet projects or trophy acquisitions, that generate private benefits
for those managers. We predict that conservatism will stem these kinds of investments because it triggers the early
recognition of losses and thus intervention by disciplining bodies such as boards of directors (Ahmed and Duellman,
2007).
While not directly examining the issues under analysis, prior research offers evidence consistent with these predictions.
Bushman et al. (2011) find that, in countries with more conservative accounting, firm investment decisions are more
sensitive to declining investment opportunities. Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) likewise show that loss reporting serves to resolve
agency problems and triggers the exercise of the abandonment option. More closely related to our research, Francis and
Martin (2010) demonstrate that conservative firms make more profitable acquisitions and divest sooner from poorly
performing acquisitions.
The above discussion leads to the following predictions:
H1a. Among firms prone to underinvestment, more conservative firms invest more.3
H1b. Among firms prone to overinvestment, more conservative firms invest less.
Information asymmetry can exacerbate over and underinvestment problems. When information asymmetry is high,
financially constrained firms face difficulties securing credit or equity. Conversely, for firms that are not financially
constrained, information asymmetry can lead to greater overinvestment, as managers can more easily evade monitoring.
Conservatism helps to alleviate these problems. Prior evidence shows that conservatism arises in response to information
asymmetries (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 2009) and that it can lower the negative consequences of
information asymmetry for debt and equity markets (Wittenberg Moerman, 2008; Kim et al., 2013). This leads to our
second hypothesis:
H2. The effects of conservatism on investment are more pronounced among firms characterized by greater information
asymmetry.
Next, we delve into specific agency issues that arise when firms are prone to underinvest versus when they are prone to
overinvest. For those prone to underinvest, especially those at risk of insolvency, two main conflicts arise. First,
equityholders have no incentives to raise new capital that would make debt safer, even if the firm is considering prudent
projects. This is the debt overhang problem described in Myers (1977). Second, equityholders have an incentive to increase
risk, as they primarily benefit from this risk. This is the risk shifting problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Myers (2003) describes an additional problem for debtholders: managers can procrastinate, concealing problems from
creditors and lengthening the effective maturity of debt.
In this situation, when firms are prone to underinvest, we expect debtholders to be the better monitors and to find
conservatism particularly useful. This occurs because conservatism triggers the timely violation of debt covenants (Zhang,
2008; Nikolaev, 2010) and promotes the early transfer of control rights to debtholders, thus addressing the concealment
problem identified by Myers (2003). This possibility that debtholders may seize control of the firm disciplines managers,
motivating them to make prudent investments. These investments may improve the firm's financial condition and help to
ensure its survival.
A lengthy literature confirms the view that conservatism contributes to debtholder monitoring. Lenders use lower
bounds of the current value of the borrower's assets in the loan granting decision and require an assurance that this
asset value will be enough to recover their loans (Watts 2003). Conservatism provides this lower bound. Consistent
with this argument, Göx and Wagenhofer (2009, p. 13) show that conservatism “maximizes the ex ante probability of
obtaining financing” and that it can reduce debt costs. In particular, Ahmed et al. (2002) and Zhang (2008) show,
respectively, that conservatism improves a firm's debt rating and decreases the initial interest rate that lenders offer.
Similarly, Wittenberg Moerman (2008) shows that conservatism reduces information asymmetries between
informed and uninformed traders in the secondary loan market. Finally, conservatism deters the artificial inflation
of earnings (Chen et al., 2007; Gao, 2013). This reduces agency costs for debtholders, as it limits the earnings available
for distribution to shareholders at the expense of lenders (Ahmed et al., 2002) and discourages managerial self
dealing (Khan and Watts, 2009).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior literature on the links between conservatism and equity financing in firms
prone to underinvest. We expect debtholders to play a more important disciplinary role when the firm suffers financial
problems. Therefore we expect shareholders to restrict equity financing in such firms. Also, given the call option nature of
shareholders' claims, among firms likely to underinvest, shareholders have incentives to pursue high risk projects. However,
these are precisely the type of projects that conservatism would make unattractive to managers, because of early loss
recognition. Equityholders thus will be less willing to provide additional capital to more conservative firms prone to
underinvestment.
The above discussion leads to our final hypotheses:
H3a. Among firms prone to underinvestment, accounting conservatism is associated with future debt issuances.
H3b. Among firms prone to underinvestment, accounting conservatism is not associated with future equity issuances.
An extension of our arguments is that we expect conservatism to play a more limited role in debt contracting for firms
likely to overinvest. In these firms, conservative accounting may not contribute to monitoring. Aggregation across many
investment projects may reduce the likelihood of poor decision making triggering debt covenant violations in healthy
profitable firms, and thus there would be no transfer of control rights to debtholders. In addition, in such cases, even if
equityholders try to restrict access to equity capital, the firms will have sufficient internal funds to forge ahead. Therefore,
for firms prone to overinvest, other monitoring mechanisms such as boards of directors are likely to matter more. However,
conservatism may also facilitate access to debt financing in the case of nonfinancially constrained firms, as it may reduce
overinvestment. This reduction will also benefit debtholders, who might in turn be more willing to lend additional funds.
Given these opposing effects, the relation between conservatism and debt financing in firms without financing constraints is
an empirical open question.4
To summarize, our initial setting is that of a firm likely to underinvest. This firm would experience the debt equity
conflicts that arise when firms are highly levered and might be at risk of insolvency, i.e., debt overhang and risk shifting
problems (Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Becker and Strömberg, 2012). Both equity and (particularly)
debtholders might then withhold financing, leading to underinvestment. We predict that conservatism alleviates these
agency conflicts, by benefiting debt holders. Therefore, under more conservative accounting, we expect to observe less
underinvestment, greater debt financing and less risk taking (greater investment in prudent projects, leading to a lower
future volatility of income) in this firm.
3. Research design
3.1. Main proxy for reporting conservatism
In our main tests, we employ the firm year proxy for conditional conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009).
Drawing from the Basu (1997) model, they estimate, at the firm level, the timeliness of earnings to good news (G Score) and
the incremental timeliness of earnings to bad news (C Score). By adding both, they obtain the total timeliness of bad news
recognition. We define our conservatism proxy as the annual decile ranks of the three year average (years t, t 1, and t 2)
of the total timeliness of loss recognition (G ScoreþC Score) and designate this measure as CONS.
We use deciles to mitigate measurement error in the estimates and reduce concerns about nonlinearities. Appendix A
contains the definitions of all variables. In Appendix B, we provide a detailed description of how we construct CONS, as well
as evidence on its correlations and association with the economic determinants of conservatism. CONS captures long term
conditional conservatism, which has contracting value and thus is relevant to our research (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, pp.
90 91). We view conservatism as being exogenous and predetermined for the current generation of managers: an ex ante
managerial choice that prevents opportunism, thereby permitting firms to accrue debt financing benefits. As is common in
accounting research, we cannot entirely rule out endogeneity concerns. However, prior research demonstrates that, in line
with our view, conservative accounting is sticky and changes slowly. Khan and Watts (2009) and Callen et al. (2010) confirm
that conservatism proxies are stable over time. In addition, we take the three year average to alleviate some of these
concerns. Finally, the use of the proxy of Khan and Watts (2009) further mitigates the concerns, given that they base their
measure on a linear combination of size, leverage and market to book ratio. Because of its construction, the Khan and Watts
proxy (2009) changes when the determinants of conservatism change. Ettredge et al. (2012) and Jayaraman (2012) show
that the Khan and Watts measure captures variation in conservatism at the firm's level, despite criticisms of the validity of
conservatism measures based on the Basu (1997) model.3
In Section 6.2, we perform robustness tests using three additional conservatism proxies: the conservatism ratio of Callen
et al. (2010), a measure based on the skewness of earnings and cash flows and a measure based on the accumulation of non
operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn, 2000).
3.2. Association between conservatism and investment efficiency
Our tests are based on the method of Biddle et al. (2009), which permits an analysis of the effects of accounting choices
in reducing both over and underinvestment. We adapt their model to capture the effects of conservatism on investment as
follows:
Investmenttþ1 ¼ βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvesttþδ3 UnderInvestt
þδ4 FRQ tþδ5 FRQ tnUnderInvesttþδ6 GOVtþδ7 GOVtnUnderInvestt
þγ Controlstþεtþ1 ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), Investment is a measure of total future investment in both capital and noncapital goods. CONS is a firm year
specific measure of conservatism. UnderInvest is a ranked variable constructed at the industry year level capturing settings
where under or overinvestment is more likely. FRQ is a measure of financial reporting quality. GOV is a set of governance
variables, and Controls is a vector of control variables that affect investment and financing. We estimate Eq. (1) in a panel
data fashion with a fixed effects model that includes year indicator variables to control for year specific shocks to
investment. We report robust standard errors based on a firm and year clustering (Petersen, 2009).
The dependent variable, Investment, measures total investment defined as capital expenditures, research and
development, and acquisition expenditures; less cash receipts from sales of property, plant, and equipment; multiplied
by 100; and scaled by lagged sales.4 In our robustness tests, we use an alternative definition of Investment.
UnderInvest is a proxy used to detect settings in which there is greater likelihood of under or overinvestment problems.
Following Biddle et al. (2009), we identify industry year combinations where there is aggregate under or overinvestment at3 There is debate about the validity of the Basu (1997) measure of conditional conservatism. Some authors claim it is invalid (e.g., Dietrich et al., 2007;
Givoly et al., 2007; Patatoukas and Thomas, 2011), while others such as Ball et al. (2013a, 2013b) provide a number of counterarguments.
4 We use sales instead of assets in the denominator to avoid introducing a mechanical association between CONS and Investment: a high level of
conservatism results in lower assets, and lower assets increase Investment if assets is used in the denominator.
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the industry level. To do so, we estimate the following regression:
InvestmentI; t ¼ β0þβ1 SalesGrowthI; t1þmI; t ð2Þ
where Investment is the average investment of all the firms in each industry year group (I, t), and SalesGrowth, a proxy for
investment opportunities, is the average sales growth of all the firms in each industry year group, where sales growth for
each firm is calculated as 100nΔSalesi, t 1/Salesi, t 2. To compute the averages, we impose a minimum of 20 firms per
industry year. Industry groups are the industry classifications in Fama and French (1997). We rank the industry year specific
residuals of model 2 multiplied by 1 into deciles and rescale the decile rankings from 0 to 1. We refer to these rankings as
UnderInvest. We then assign these decile rankings to each firm by year and industry membership. High (low) values of
UnderInvest identify settings in which under investment (over investment) at the industry year level is most likely. In
unreported sensitivity tests, we also use an alternative definition of UnderInvest: a ranked variable based on the average of a
decile ranked measure of cash and a decile ranked measure of leverage. Using this alternative definition, also based on the
work of Biddle et al. (2009), we obtain identical inferences.
We use Eq. (1) to test hypotheses H1a and H1b, that is, whether conservatism reduces under and overinvestment. In Eq.
(1), the coefficients of interest are δ1 and δ2. We expect conservatism to reduce both under and overinvestment. Therefore,
when underinvestment is likely (i.e., UnderInvest¼1), we expect the sum of the coefficients δ1 and δ2 to be positive,
indicating that conservatism increases investment in settings where underinvestment is most likely. On the contrary, when
overinvestment is likely (i.e., UnderInvest¼0), we expect coefficient δ1 to be negative and significant, indicating that
conservatism decreases investment in such settings.
To test H2, we extend the previous analysis to investigate whether conservatism contributes to the reduction of
investment inefficiencies in settings where information asymmetries between managers and the providers of finance are
more pronounced. Given that conservatism appears in response to information asymmetries, we expect the effects of
conservatism on investment to be particularly pronounced when information asymmetry is high. To test this idea, we
estimate the following regression:
Investmenttþ1 ¼ βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnInfoAsymtþδ3 CONStnUnderInvestt
þδ4 CONStnUnderInvesttnInfoAsymtþγ Controlstþεtþ1 ð3Þ
where all variables have been defined previously, except for InfoAsym. We use three proxies for information asymmetry
(InfoAsym). Given our prior theoretical arguments, we are particularly interested in measuring information asymmetry for
debt investors. To measure information asymmetry for debt investors, LaFond and Watts (2008) use a market based proxy,
and finance researchers commonly use proxies such as the bid ask spread (e.g., Krishnaswami et al., 1999), given that
information asymmetries between all users of accounting information are likely correlated. Thus our first proxy (IA) is
market based. It is the average of the standardized values of bid ask spread, stock return volatility, and idiosyncratic risk.
Regarding information asymmetries between the firm and debtholders, we introduce two proxies following Sufi (2007,
2009) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006): (1) a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has no credit rating
(NCR) and (2) the negative of the firm's age (Young), as younger firms are less known by investors. Firms with no credit
rating and younger firms are more likely to have higher information asymmetries. The details of the calculations of these
proxies can be found in Appendix A.
Finally, to test hypothesis H3a, we use the following model:
ΔDebt issuancetþ1 ¼ βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvesttþδ3 UnderInvestt
þδ4 FRQ tþδ5 FRQ tnUnderInvesttþδ6 GOVtþδ7 GOVtnUnderInvestt
þγ Controlstþεtþ1 ð4Þ
The dependent variable, ΔDebt issuancetþ1, is defined as the future change in new debt issuance scaled by current sales.
Debt issuance equals long term debt issuance, minus the reduction in long term debt, plus changes in current debt. If more
conservative firms in settings prone to underinvestment issue more debt than less conservative firms, we expect the sum of
δ1 and δ2 to be positive and significant. We also predict a negative association between conservatism and equity issuance in
settings prone to underinvestment. We test H3b using the change in future equity issuance (ΔEquity issuancetþ1) as the
dependent variable in Eq. (4), keeping the rest of the model unaltered. In this case, we expect conservatism to relate
negatively to equity issuance. This occurs for two reasons. First, equityholders, in settings prone to underinvestment, would
prefer prudent new projects to be funded by debtholders, who are likely better at monitoring in such cases. Also,
equityholders are expected to be less willing to provide additional capital to more conservative financially constrained firms.
In these firms, conservatism prevents investments in risky projects that benefit equityholders at the expense of debt
holders. We therefore expect the sum of δ1 and δ2 to be negative when we model future equity issuance. The details of the
measurement of this new dependent variable are in Appendix A.
Throughout Eqs. (1), (3), and (4) we control for financial reporting quality (FRQ) to ensure that conservatism is not a
proxy for accruals quality. We follow Biddle et al. (2009) and use a measure of accruals quality based on the work of Dechow
and Dichev (2002). Appendix A contains the estimation details.
Corporate governance quality can also affect a firm's investments and financing, so to ensure that we isolate the effects of
conservatism, we follow Biddle et al. (2009) and incorporate the following into our three main models: (a) the percentage of6
the firm's shares held by institutional investors (Institutions), (b) the number of analysts following the firm (Analysts), and
(c) the measure of antitakeover protection developed by Gompers et al. (2003), multiplied by 1 (InvGIM Score). Because
InvGIM Score is not available for the full sample, we also incorporate (d) GIM Score dum, a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 when the GIM Score is missing and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we include additional controls for effects that can confound our results. In particular, we follow previous research
and identify variables that affect either investment5 or financing.6 Specifically, we control for size, leverage, market to book
ratio (MTB), depreciation method (AcceDep), the volatility of cash flow from operations (StdCFO), volatility of sales
(StdSales), volatility of investment (StdInvestment), bankruptcy risk (Z Score), proportion of tangible assets (Tangibility),
industry capital structure (Ind Cap Struc), operating cash flow to sales (CFOsale), dividend payout ratio (Dividend), length of
the operating cycle (OperCycle), length of the investment cycle (InvCycle), frequency of losses (Loss), and financial slack
(Slack). We also control for information asymmetries between the firm and capital providers. To capture information
asymmetries with equityholders, we use our previously described summary measure (IA), constructed by averaging the
standardized values of three measures: the bid ask spread, the standard deviation of daily stock returns, and idiosyncratic
risk. Regarding information asymmetries between the firm and debtholders, we use NCR (no credit rating) and Young, as
previously defined. As past stock performance can influence the issuance of equity, we also include annual stock returns
(Ret) as an additional control variable (Lucas and McDonald, 1990) when we use equity issuance as a dependent variable in
Eq. (4). Appendix A describes how all of these variables are constructed.4. Main empirical results
4.1. Sample and data
We use Compustat for accounting data and CRSP for stock market data. Analyst data come from IBES, ownership data
from Thomson Financial, and governance data from Gompers et al. (2003). To increase the power of our tests, we employ as
many observations as possible from the available data sources. Our sample covers 18 years 1990 to 2007. The sample spans
these years because this is when some of the governance variables are available. Financial firms are excluded because their
accounting differs and because they invest differently. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are
winsorized annually at the first and 99th percentiles. These selection procedures result in a maximum of 41,626 firm year
observations, although the number of observations varies depending on the type of test conducted. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics of the main variables. The reported values for the conservatism proxy are in line with those in Khan and
Watts (2009), and the values of the control variables are also similar to those in Biddle et al. (2009). Table 1 also contains
descriptive statistics for the full sample and the underinvestment and overinvestment subsamples. The under and
overinvestment subsamples correspond to observations in the first and third tercile, respectively, of the distribution of
UnderInvest.4.2. Association between conservatism and investment efficiency
In our first analysis, we study the association between conservatism and investment efficiency. Table 2 reports the results
of estimating Eq. (1). In Column I, we replicate the results in Biddle et al. (2009) on the effects of financial reporting quality
on over and underinvestment. Consistent with their results, we find that financial reporting quality (FRQ) mitigates both
overinvestment and underinvestment. The results on conservatism are reported in Column II. We find evidence that
conservatism is positively associated with investment in firm year observations with a greater likelihood of under
investment. In particular, the sum of coefficients δ1 and δ2 (1.338, t stat¼3.40) is positive and significant at conventional
levels, confirming that more conservative firms invest more in settings prone to underinvestment (i.e., UnderInvest¼1). The
negative and significant δ1 coefficient ( 2.182, t stat¼ 4.46) also confirms that conservatism constrains investment in
firms that are likely to overinvest (i.e., UnderInvest¼0). The economic significance is such that a one decile change in CONS
translates into an increase (decrease) in investment, relative to its mean, of 5.3% (8.6%). These results confirm hypotheses
H1a and H1b.
As for the effect of the governance variables, the results are generally insignificant or have an unexpected sign. These
findings resemble those of Biddle et al. (2009) and point to the difficulties in measuring governance. They may also indicate
that the financial reporting proxies (FRQ and CONS) subsume governance. These results could also be attributable to the
drawbacks of tight governance mechanisms over managerial investment decisions (e.g., Bargeron et al., 2010).5 Dechow (1994), Dechow et al. (1998), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Liu and Wysocki (2007), Jackson (2008), Jackson et al.
(2009), and Biddle et al. (2009).
6 Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Leland (1994), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Barclay and Smith (1999), Hovakimian et al. (2001),
Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003, 2009), Hovakimian (2004), Chang et al. (2006, 2009), and Rauh and Sufi (2010).
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Table 1
Univariate statistics.
Variable Full sample UnderInvest OverInvest
Mean Median std Mean Median Mean Median
Investmenttþ1% 25.29 10.05 62.49 9.90 4.83 39.64 15.79
CONS 0.136 0.136 0.08 0.144 0.141 0.131 0.133
FRQ 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.23
Institutions 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.29
Analysts 4.38 2.00 6.37 4.42 2.00 4.51 2.00
InvGIM-Score 3.41 0.00 4.74 3.77 0.00 3.16 0.00
GIM-Score-dum 0.63 1.00 0.48 0.60 1.00 0.65 1.00
IA 0.00 0.11 0.91 0.11 0.24 0.09 0.04
NCR 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.62 1.00 0.58 1.00
Young 17.82 12.76 14.71 18.85 13.59 16.97 11.92
Size 5.60 5.48 2.02 5.59 5.47 5.67 5.55
MTB 2.70 1.92 2.53 2.37 1.77 2.97 2.08
Leverage 0.42 0.17 0.70 0.50 0.23 0.34 0.12
AcceDep 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.00
StdCFO % 9.19 6.53 9.04 8.18 6.05 10.24 7.11
StdSales % 20.83 14.37 20.75 23.25 15.98 19.76 13.63
StdInvestment 0.42 0.06 2.14 0.15 0.03 0.68 0.08
Z-Score 1.60 1.85 2.04 2.43 2.46 0.99 1.34
Tangibility % 31.36 24.51 23.84 29.69 25.36 31.62 22.25
Ind-Cap-Struc 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.11
CFOsale 0.16 0.07 9.40 0.04 0.05 0.37 0.09
Dividend 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.39 0.00
OperCycle 4.69 4.76 0.70 4.63 4.74 4.75 4.79
InvCycle % 5.20 4.51 3.16 4.65 4.22 5.41 4.53
Loss 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.17 0.00 0.29 0.00
Slack 2.10 0.28 5.84 1.05 0.20 3.15 0.45
Stock return 0.17 0.07 0.60 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.07
ΔNew debt issuancetþ1% 0.91 0.00 19.34 0.76 0.00 1.24 0.00
ΔNew equity issuancetþ1% 0.17 0.00 28.08 0.12 0.00 0.38 0.00
Volatility Future ROA, adjusted % 0.02 1.72 12.09 0.04 1.65 0.13 1.73
Volatility Past ROA, adjusted % 0.02 1.84 14.49 0.04 1.72 0.05 1.96
Mean (ROAtþ1 ROAtþ2 ROAtþ3) % 5.68 8.01 16.27 7.75 8.50 3.70 7.42
The sample covers the period 1990–2007 and contains a maximum of 41,626 observations. The UnderInvest (or OverInvest) subsample includes
observations in the top (bottom) tercile of the distribution of UnderInvest, which captures settings where under- or overinvestment is more likely. Details
for the construction of the variables can be found in Appendix A. Investment is a measure of total investment calculated as capital expenditures plus
research and development plus acquisition expenditures less cash receipts from sales of PPE, multiplied by 100, and scaled by lagged sales. CONS is based
on the firm-year measure of conditional conservatism constructed by Khan and Watts (2009). It measures the timeliness of loss recognition, and it is
defined as the three-year average of G-Score plus C-Score. G-Score is the timeliness of good news, and C-Score is the incremental timeliness of bad news.
Higher values of CONS are associated with higher conservatism. FRQ is a measure of accruals quality based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), standardized.
Institutions is the percentage of the firm's shares held by institutional investors. Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. InvGIM-Score is the
measure of antitakeover protection developed by Gompers et al. (2003), multiplied by 1. When GIM-Score is missing, InvGIM-Score is assigned the value
of 0. GIM-Score-dum is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if GIM-Score is missing and 0 otherwise. IA is a continuous variable that measures
market-based information asymmetry. It is computed as the average of the standardized values of BAS, Volatility, and Idiosyncratic risk. BAS is the bid–ask
spread defined as the annual average of daily spread scaled by the midpoint between bid and ask. Volatility is the standard deviation of one year of daily
stock returns. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the residual return from a market model regression of
excess returns on value-weighted market excess returns for 60 months (minimum 24 months). NCR is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm does
not have a credit rating in Compustat and 0 otherwise. Size is the log of the market value of equity. Young is the negative of the difference between the first
year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. MTB is the market-to-book value of equity ratio. Leverage equals short-term plus long-term debt
scaled by the market value of equity. AcceDep is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm uses accelerated depreciation and 0 otherwise. StdCFO is the
firm-specific standard deviation of the cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets, for years t5 to t1, as a percentage. StdSales is the firm-
specific standard deviation of annual sales deflated by average total assets, for years t5 to t1, as a percentage. StdInvestment is the firm-specific
standard deviation of annual Investment for years t5 to t1. Z-Score is a measure of bankruptcy risk. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and
equipment to total assets, as a percentage. Ind-Cap-Struc is the mean of capital structure for firms in the same SIC three-digit industry group, where capital
structure is the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity. CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to average sales. Dividend is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend and 0 otherwise. OperCycle is the log of receivables to sales plus inventory to COGS
multiplied by 360. InvCycle is a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle defined as depreciation expense scaled by lagged total assets, as a
percentage. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise. Slack is the ratio of cash
to net property, plant, and equipment, as a percentage. Stock return is the annual stock rate of return of the firm, measured by compounding 12-monthly
CRSP stock returns ending at the fiscal-year end. ΔDebt issuance is defined as the future change in debt issuance, scaled by current sales, as a percentage:
(Debt issuancetþ1Debt issuancet)/Salest where Debt issuance (Long-term debt issuanceLong-term debt reductionþCurrent debt changes). ΔEquity
issuance is defined as the future change in equity issuance, scaled by current sales, as a percentage: (Equity issuancetþ1Equity issuancet)/Salest where
Equity issuance (Sale of common and preferred stockPurchase of common and preferred stock). Volatility Future ROA adjusted is the standard deviation
of future ROA, measured over the period tþ1 to tþ5, and adjusted by subtracting the industry-year mean, where ROA equals pretax income plus interest
expense scaled by lagged total assets, as a percentage. Volatility Past ROA adjusted is the standard deviation of past ROA, measured over the period t-4 to t,
and adjusted by subtracting the industry-year mean. Mean (ROAtþ1 ROAtþ2 ROAtþ3) is the three-year average of ROAtþ1, ROAtþ2, ROAtþ3, as a percentage.
All continuous variables are winsorized annually at the top and bottom percentiles.
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Table 2
Association between future investment and accounting conservatism.
Investmenttþ1 βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvesttþγ Controlstþεtþ1
Column I Column II
Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat
CONS (δ1) 2.182 4.46nnn
CONSnUnderInvest (δ2) 3.520 6.05nnn
CONSþCONSnUnderInvest (i.e., δ1þδ2) 1.338 3.40nnn
Controls
FRQ 0.909 1.70n 0.877 1.65n
FRQnUnderInvest 2.889 3.13nnn 2.845 3.13nnn
Institutions 6.127 2.07nn 5.822 1.92n
InstitutionsnUnderInvest 0.700 0.16 0.569 0.13
Analysts 0.064 0.50 0.156 1.13
AnalystsnUnderInvest 0.520 2.80nnn 0.142 0.64
InvGIM-Score 0.536 2.67nnn 0.759 3.64nnn
InvGIM-ScorenUnderInvest 1.613 6.32nnn 2.107 8.25nnn
GIM-Score-dum 6.180 3.87nnn 5.751 3.59nnn
UnderInvest 16.42 7.51nnn 40.63 9.43nnn
IA 2.014 2.29nn 1.963 2.25nn
NCR 1.619 1.30 1.531 1.25
Young 0.123 5.12nnn 0.113 4.61nnn
Size 2.226 5.54nnn 1.096 1.90n
MTB 1.387 4.18nnn 1.219 3.85nnn
Leverage 4.733 6.12nnn 4.497 6.09nnn
AcceDep 6.719 4.80nnn 6.665 4.79nnn
StdCFO 0.165 1.86n 0.189 2.07nn
StdSales 0.132 3.81nnn 0.130 3.76nnn
StdInvestment 8.482 11.38nnn 8.449 11.41nnn
Z-Score 6.252 10.83nnn 6.270 10.89nnn
Tangibility 0.326 6.16nnn 0.331 6.27nnn
Ind-Cap-Struc 22.01 5.22nnn 20.08 4.72nnn
CFOsale 0.712 1.98nn 0.711 1.98nn
Dividend 4.203 4.42nnn 4.233 4.32nnn
OperCycle 1.460 1.24 1.415 1.20
InvCycle 0.427 1.63 0.428 1.62
Loss 5.430 3.21nnn 5.280 3.09nnn
Slack 1.695 5.69nnn 1.680 5.64nnn
R2 0.337 0.339
N. obs. 41,626 41,626
Investment is a measure of total investment. CONS is the annual decile rankings of the three-year average of the conditional conservatism measure
constructed by Khan and Watts (2009). UnderInvest is a ranked variable that identifies settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) at the
industry-year level is most likely. UnderInvest takes values from 1 to 0; values closer to 1 (0) indicate settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment)
is most likely at the industry level. The other control variables are defined in Appendix A. The regressions include year fixed effects. Reported t-statistics are
based on robust standard errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm and year level. The symbols nnn, nn, and n denote two-sided significance at the level of
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.4.3. Future investment and conservatism: effects of information asymmetry
Under H2, we predict that information asymmetries contribute to the investment effects of conservatism. Table 3
contains the results of estimating Eq. (3) for each of our three information asymmetry proxies. For parsimony, we report
only the coefficients of interest. In settings prone to underinvestment, the coefficient δ4 on the three way interaction among
CONS, UnderInvest, and InfoAsym is positive and significant for all three, which confirms that, in under investment settings,
the contribution of conservatism to increase investment is greater when information asymmetry is high. In overinvestment
settings with high information asymmetry, conservatism also plays a greater role in decreasing investment: the coefficient
δ2 is significantly negative in all cases. Overall, these findings suggest that the investment benefits of conservatism are
greater for firms subject to larger information asymmetries, as expected.
4.4. Association between conservatism and access to debt financing
In our third analysis, we study whether more conservative firms, in settings where underinvestment is likely, issue more
debt than less conservative ones, as predicted by hypothesis H3a. Table 4, Panel A, displays the results of estimating Eq. (4).
We observe that the sum of δ1 and δ2 is positive and significant (δ1þδ2¼0.778, t stat¼3.63). This indicates a positive
association between conservatism and future change in debt issuance in settings prone to underinvestment (i.e.,9
Table 3
Effect of information asymmetry on the association between future investment and conservatism.
Investmenttþ1 βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnInfoAsymt
þδ3 CONStnUnderInvesttþδ4CONStnUnderInvesttnInfoAsymtþγ Controlstþεtþ1
Information asymmetry proxy: IA Coeff. t-Stat
CONS 2.123 4.40nnn
CONSnIA 2.189 6.63nnn
CONSþCONSnIA (i.e., δ1þδ2) 4.312 6.07nnn
CONSnUnderInvest 3.839 6.38nnn
CONSnUnderInvestnIA 2.672 4.96nnn
CONSþCONSnIAþCONSnUnderInvestþCONSnUnderInvestnIA 2.199 3.70nnn
(i.e., δ1þδ2þδ3þδ4)
Controls included Yes
Information asymmetry proxy: No Credit Rating (NCR) Coeff. t-Stat
CONS 0.968 1.44
CONSnNCR 2.038 3.37nnn
CONSþCONSnNCR (i.e., δ1þδ2) 3.006 6.16nnn
CONSnUnderInvest 1.754 2.09nn
CONSnUnderInvestnNCR 2.980 3.36nnn
CONSþCONSnNCRþCONSn UnderInvestþCONSnUnderInvestnNCR 1.728 4.05nnn
(i.e., δ1þδ2þδ3þδ4)
Controls included Yes
Information asymmetry proxy: Young Coeff. t-Stat
CONS 2.877 4.67nnn
CONSnYoung 0.046 3.43nnn
CONSþCONSnYoung (i.e., δ1þδ2) 2.923 4.67nnn
CONSnUnderInvest 4.028 5.06nnn
CONSnUnderInvestnYoung 0.037 1.75n
CONSþCONSnYoungþCONSn UnderInvestþCONSnUnderInvestnYoung 1.142 2.61nnn
(i.e., δ1þδ2þδ3þδ4)
Controls included Yes
N. obs. 41,626
The table reports only the coefficients of interest of the above regression using three different proxies for information asymmetry. Investment is a measure
of total investment. CONS is the annual decile rankings of the three-year average of the conditional conservatism measure constructed by Khan and Watts
(2009). UnderInvest is a ranked variable that identifies settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) at the industry-year level is most likely.
UnderInvest takes values from 1 to 0; values closer to 1 (0) indicate settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) is most likely at the industry level.
IA is a continuous variable that measures market-based information asymmetry. It is computed as the average of the standardized values of the bid–ask
spread, stock return volatility, and idiosyncratic risk. The next two variables capture information asymmetry between the firm and debtholders. NCR is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has no credit rating in Compustat and 0 otherwise. Young is the negative of the difference between the first year
when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. The other control variables are defined in Appendix A. The regressions include year fixed effects.
Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm and year level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote two-sided
significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.UnderInvest¼1), consistent with our predictions. In terms of economic significance, a one decile change in conservatism
results in an increase in future debt issuance of 2.6%, relative to average total debt, among firms that are underinvesting. In
settings where overinvestment is likely (i.e., UnderInvest¼0), there is no association between conservatism and future
change in debt issuance (δ1 is not significant at conventional levels). This is consistent with our expectation that the role of
conservatism in debt financing is less important for healthy firms.
We also analyze the effect of conservatism on equity issuance. Table 4, Panel B, contains the results. Under H3b, we do
not expect an association between conservatism and the issuance of equity. Consistent with our hypothesis, the sum of δ1
and δ2 is not significant at conventional levels. Overall, the evidence reported in Table 4 confirms that the additional funding
obtained by conservative firms comes from new debt, not equity.5. Analysis of proﬁtability consequences
The predicted effects of conservatism on investment and financing have consequences for a firm's profitability that are
not particularly obvious. In settings prone to overinvestment, we predict that, conservatism reduces the investment in
negative NPV projects and hastens the abandonment of poorly performing ones, thereby increasing the future ROA. This is
consistent with the results of Francis and Martin (2010), who find that more conservative firms make more profitable
acquisitions. It is also consistent with the evidence of Hope and Thomas (2008), who show that better reporting in the form
of improved geographic earnings disclosures prevents empire building, leading to greater profitability. However, in settings10
Table 4
Association between future debt or equity issuance and accounting conservatism.
Panel A: Debt issuance and conservatism.
ΔDebt issuancetþ1 βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvesttþγ Controlstþεtþ1
Dependent variable: ΔDebt issuancetþ1 Coeff. t-Stat
CONS 0.058 0.32
CONSnUnderInvest 0.720 5.22nnn
CONSþCONSnUnderInvest (i.e., δ1þδ2) 0.778 3.63nnn
Controls included Yes
R2 0.033
N. obs. 33,899
Panel B: Equity issuance and conservatism
ΔEquity issuancetþ1 βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvesttþγ Controlstþεtþ1
Dependent variable: ΔEquity issuancetþ1 Coeff. t-Stat
CONS 0.201 0.26
CONSnUnderInvest 0.241 0.73
CONSþCONSnUnderInvest (i.e., δ1þδ2) 0.442 0.76
Controls included Yes
R2 0.043
N. obs. 33,862
The dependent variable ΔDebt issuancetþ1 equals (Debt issuancetþ1 Debt issuancet)/Salest, as a percentage. The dependent variable ΔEquity issuancetþ1
equals (Equity issuancetþ1Equity issuancet)/Salest, as a percentage. CONS is the annual decile rankings of the three-year average of the conservatism
measure constructed by Khan and Watts (2009). Higher values of CONS are associated with higher conservatism. UnderInvest is a ranked variable that
identifies settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) at the industry-year level is most likely. UnderInvest takes values from 1 to 0; values closer
to 1 (0) indicate settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) is most likely at the industry level. The other control variables are defined in
Appendix A. The regressions include year fixed effects. Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm and year
level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote two-sided significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.prone to underinvestment, it is less clear how the effects of conservatism on financing and investment affect the future ROA.
In such settings, conservatism increases investment by facilitating access to additional debt. As previously argued,
conservatism is expected to foster investment in prudent (low risk) projects, which probably yield positive but low net
present values. Also, assuming that managers have several projects to choose from and prefer projects that, ceteris paribus,
are more profitable, they would start by choosing the most profitable ones before moving to the increasingly less profitable
ones (i.e., there are diminishing marginal returns on investment). If so, increased investment by more conservative firms in
underinvestment settings would lead to investment in prudent projects that is, projects with lower volatility than that of
their existing investments. These prudent projects would, in turn, result in a) lower volatility of the future ROA and b) a
future ROA that is no greater than that of less conservative firms. We thus also examine the association of conservatismwith
the volatility of a firm's future ROA. Our model is as follows:
Volatility Future ROA¼ βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvestt
þδ3 UnderInvesttþδ4 FRQ tþδ5 FRQ tnUnderInvesttþδ4 GOVt
þδ5 GOVtnUnderInvesttþγ Controlstþε ð5Þ
where Volatility Future ROA is the standard deviation of the future ROA, measured over the period tþ1 to tþ5, and adjusted
by subtracting the Fama and French (1997) industry year mean.7 ROA equals pretax income plus interest expense scaled by
lagged total assets, as a percentage. We use the same set of control variables as in Eq. (3) and add as a control variable the
volatility of the past ROA, measured over the period t 4 to t, and adjusted by subtracting the industry year mean. The main
coefficient of interest in Eq. (5) is the sum of δ1 and δ2. According to our hypotheses, conservative firms have greater access
to debt to invest in low risk (prudent) projects. As conservative firms pursue additional low risk projects (with lower risk
than the existing projects), we expect to observe a decrease in the firms' overall future (total) risk. Therefore we expect the
sum of δ1 and δ2 to be significantly negative if conservatism is associated with investments in more prudent projects.
Finally, we directly study the effects of conservatism on future performance. To do so, we employ the following model:
MeanðROAtþ1 ROAtþ2 ROAtþ3Þ ¼ βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvestt
þδ3 UnderInvesttþδ4 FRQ tþδ5 FRQ tnUnderInvesttþδ4GOVt
þδ5 GOVtnUnderInvesttþγ Controlstþε ð6Þ
Our metric of accounting performance is the return on assets ratio. The dependent variable, Mean (ROAtþ1 ROAtþ2
ROAtþ3), is defined as the mean of ROA for the following three years, where ROA is defined as before. We use a three year7 We use a period of five years to obtain reasonable estimates of the standard deviation.
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average to reduce measurement error and also because new investments may take more than one year to produce returns.
In Eq. (6) we add current ROA to the set of control variables to account for the effect of current profitability on future
profitability. All other variables are defined as before.
If conservatism curbs overinvestment in poor projects, we predict that δ1 in Eq. (6) should be significantly positive,
indicating greater future profitability for more conservative firms in settings prone to overinvestment, consistent with
Francis and Martin (2010). On the other hand, we predict that conservative firms in settings prone to underinvestment will
gain access to additional debt and will be able to undertake additional prudent investments. Given this, we make no
prediction about the sign of the sum of coefficients δ1 and δ2.
Table 5 reports the results for these predictions. The sample size is slightly reduced given that we require additional data
to calculate the future ROA and its volatility. Table 5, Panel A, displays the results of the estimation of Eq. (5), on the effects of
conservatism on the volatility of the future ROA. The sum of coefficients δ1 and δ2 is significantly negative (δ1þδ2¼ 0.203,
t stat¼2.20), confirming the negative association between conservatism and future ROA volatility for firms in settings prone
to underinvestment. In an unreported sensitivity test, we replicate Table 5, Panel A, using the volatility of future returns, and
the inferences do not change.
In Table 5, Panel B, we report the results of the estimation of Eq. (6), on the effect of conservatism on future performance.
We observe a positive and marginally significant δ1 coefficient (p val. δ140¼0.081). This is consistent with the expectation
that conservatism prompts the termination of bad investments in overinvesting firms, leading to increases in future
performance. For underinvesting firms, even though δ2 is negative and consistent with our prediction, the sum of δ1 and δ2 is
not significant at conventional levels. Overall, the results in Table 5 support our arguments that, in underinvestment
scenarios, conservatism is associated with increased investment in more prudent projects and that these investments do not
necessarily lead to higher future profitability.
6. Robustness tests
6.1. Alternative measure of investment
Acquisitions are highly visible and easily monitored. Other investments, such as capital expenditures or R&D, are more
opaque. Investments in R&D are particularly difficult to monitor. As noted in Aboody and Lev (2000), R&D tends to be unique
to the firm, and investors can derive little information about a firm's R&D productivity and value from observing the
performance of other firms. Also, there are no organized markets for R&D, and the immediate expensing of R&D outlaysTable 5
Association between conservatism and future accounting performance.
Panel A: Volatility of future ROA and conservatism.
Volatility Future ROA βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvesttþγ Controlstþε
Dependent variable: Volatility Future ROA Coeff. t-Stat
CONS 0.051 0.48
CONSnUnderInvest 0.254 2.68nnn
CONSþCONSnUnderInvest (i.e., δ1þδ2) 0.203 2.20nn
Controls included Yes
R2 0.138
N. obs. 32,362
Panel B: Future ROA and conservatism
Mean ROAtþ1 ROAtþ2 ROAtþ3ð Þ βtþδ1 CONStþδ2 CONStnUnderInvesttþγ Controlstþε
Dependent variable: Mean (ROAtþ1 ROAtþ2 ROAtþ3) Coeff. t-Stat
CONS 0.181 1.40†
CONSnUnderInvest 0.107 0.79
CONSþCONSnUnderInvest (i.e., δ1þδ2) 0.074 0.46
Controls included Yes
R2 0.478
N. obs. 38,726
The dependent variable in Panel A, Volatility Future ROA, is the standard deviation of future ROA, measured over the period tþ1 to tþ5, and adjusted by
subtracting the industry-year mean. The dependent variable in Panel B, Mean (ROAtþ1 ROAtþ2 ROAtþ3), is the three-year average of ROAtþ1, ROAtþ2,
ROAtþ3, as a percentage. ROA equals pretax income plus interest expense scaled by lagged total assets, as a percentage. CONS is the annual decile rankings
of the three-year average of the conservatism measure constructed by Khan and Watts (2009). Higher values of CONS are associated with higher
conservatism. UnderInvest is a ranked variable that identifies settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) at the industry-year level is most likely.
UnderInvest takes values from 1 to 0; values closer to 1 (0) indicate settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) is most likely at the industry level.
The other control variables are defined in Appendix A. The regressions include year fixed effects. Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors
adjusted using a cluster at the firm and year level. The symbols nnn, nn, n, and † denote two-sided significance at the level of 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%,
respectively.
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precludes reporting to investors about R&D value and productivity. Given this, we repeat the analysis of Table 2 using an
alternative dependent variable that captures investments that are less transparent than acquisitions and harder to monitor.
This results in a higher demand for conservatism. Our alternative dependent variable is future capital expenditures plus R&D
(Capex_R&D). Capex_R&D is defined as future capital expenditure plus R&D scaled by lagged sales, as a percentage. Because
R&D is immediately expensed under US GAAP, one might think that conditional conservatism plays no role in its monitoring.
However, if an R&D investment fails, in all likelihood, project specific capital assets and inventories will have to be written
off. If there is bad news about a particular R&D investment, more conservative firms will accelerate the write off of project
specific assets, recording a reduction in earnings.8 This effect is expected to be an important reason why more conservative
firms are less likely to engage in bad R&D projects. In line with this idea, Göx and Wagenhofer (2009) develop an analytical
model that predicts that firms with high proportions of intangible assets will be more conservative and have stricter
impairment rules.
Unreported results using Capex_R&D as the dependent variable provide strong evidence in favor of the previous findings.
More conservative firms are less likely to under and overinvest. In particular, a one decile increase in CONS increases
(decreases) investment in Capex_R&D by 4.4% (8.0%) among firms that are underinvesting (overinvesting). Overall, these
results with Capex_R&D confirm the role of conservatism as a monitoring tool in the case of less transparent investments.
Also, these results rule out the possibility that our main findings could simply be capturing the results in Francis and Martin
(2010).6.2. Alternative conservatism proxies
In our final set of tests, we use three alternative measures of conservatism. The first is the conservatism ratio proposed by
Callen et al. (2010). The other two are based on the work of Givoly and Hayn (2000).
Callen et al.'s (2010) ratio, which we designate as CONS¼CR, builds on the return decomposition model of Vuolteenaho
(2002). CR is a measure of conditional conservatism that shows the proportion of the total shock to current and expected
future earnings recognized in current year earnings. As with the previous measure, we define CONS¼CR as the annual decile
ranks of the three year average of CR. To calculate CR, we follow Callen et al. (2010), estimating a pooled regression per
industry across time using all sample years available (up to 2007 in our sample). This can cause a look ahead bias in the
estimates of CR because, for example, the conservatism measure for 1995 uses future information from 1996 to 2007. To
avoid look ahead bias, we use a 25 year rolling window approach ending in the current year of each CR measure. For
example, to estimate CR for 1995, our pooled regressions across time only include the years 1971 1995. Finally, since
conservatism is likely to manifest itself when news is bad, following Callen et al. (2010, p. 168), we restrict the sample to
observations with negative unexpected returns. Like Callen et al., we also drop observations with negative CR as its
interpretation is ambiguous. In this way, our CR measure captures the total timeliness of bad news recognition and mirrors
the measure of Khan and Watts (2009). Using this alternative measure of conservatism, we can replicate all of the tests in
the paper, reaching identical inferences, with the following exceptions. In Table 3, the information asymmetry proxy NCR
does not load significantly, and in Table 5, Panel B, about future profitability, the results are not significant at conventional
levels.
Regarding the measures based on the work of Givoly and Hayn (2000), we first use the negative of the ratio of the
skewness of net income to the skewness of cash flow from operations, as in Zhang (2008). To obtain measures of skewness,
we use rolling five year windows. Finally, we take annual decile rankings and denote this measure as CONS¼SKW. Our
second proxy based on Givoly and Hayn (2000) is the three year accumulation of non operating accruals.9 To control for the
great variation in the type and size of non operating accruals across industry groups, we adjust our measure by subtracting
the industry mean every year, using the Fama and French industry groups. Next, we multiply the industry adjusted non
operating accruals by 1 so that the resulting figure is increasing in conservatism. Finally, we take annual decile rankings
and denote this measure as CONS¼NOACC.
These two proxies (CONS¼SKW and CONS¼NOACC) capture both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We are
interested in conditional conservatism, as it is the only one with contracting value. Thus these proxies capture conditional
conservatism with greater noise, and we expect weaker results. Untabulated results are summarized as follows. When we
use CONS¼SKW, we can reproduce the findings in all previous tests except for Table 4, Panel A, and Table 5, Panel A. For
CONS¼NOACC, we reproduce the main results reported in Tables 2 and 3, but only for underinvestment settings, and
Table 4, Panel B.8 An example of a failing R&D project that led to impairments was the recent battle between the developers of Blu-ray and HD DVD formats to replace
the DVD standard. Eventually the HD DVD format lost and, in February 2008, Toshiba, the format's creator, announced plans to stop developing,
manufacturing and marketing HD DVD players and recorders. As a result, Toshiba recognized an impairment charge of $483 million, equivalent to 38% of
reported net income. Approximately 50% of the write-off corresponded to long-lived assets and the rest to inventories.
9 Non-operating accruals are defined as follows. Total accruals before depreciationOperating accruals IBC(OANCFXIDOC)þDP(ΔACTΔ-
CHEΔLCTþΔDLC). All items are scaled by sales. The acronyms represent Compustat items.
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7. Conclusions
We study the association between conservatism and the investment efficiency of firms. We find that, in settings where
firms are prone to underinvest, more conservative firms invest more and raise more debt than less conservative ones. These
effects of conservatism on investment and financing are more pronounced in the presence of information asymmetries. Our
empirical evidence is consistent with prior analytical work showing that conservatism facilitates access to debt (Göx and
Wagenhofer, 2009). This comports with prior research that indicates that debtholders demand conservative accounting
because it facilitates their monitoring. We also find that, in settings prone to overinvestment, conservatism reduces
investment not only for acquisitions, as documented by Francis and Martin (2010), but also for other harder to monitor
types of investments.
Overall, our evidence strongly suggests that conservatism can lead to a direct benefit to investors in the form of more
efficient investments. Therefore we add to a growing number of studies that demonstrate that accounting conservatism,
through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, generates positive economic outcomes (Ahmed et al.,
2002; Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Suijs, 2008; Wittenberg Moerman, 2008; Zhang, 2008; Khan
and Watts, 2009; Göx and Wagenhofer, 2009; Francis and Martin, 2010; García Lara et al., 2011; Gormley et al., 2012;
Ettredge et al., 2012; Jayaraman and Shivakumar, 2013). One interpretation of our evidence is that the elimination of
conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesired economic consequences.
Appendix A. Deﬁnitions of variablesInvestmenttþ1 is the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure, less cash receipts
from the sale of property, plant, and equipment; multiplied by 100; and scaled by lagged sales.ΔDebt issuancetþ1 is defined as the future change in new debt issuance, scaled by current sales, as a percentage: (Debt issuancetþ1Debt
issuancet)/Salest, where Debt issuance (Long-term debt issuanceLong-term debt reductionþCurrent debt changes).ΔEquity issuancetþ1 is defined as the future change in new equity issuance, scaled by current sales, as a percentage: (Equity
issuancetþ1Equity issuancet)/Salest, where Equity issuance (Sale of common and preferred stockPurchase of
common and preferred stock).CONS is a conservatism proxy developed by Khan and Watts (2009). It is defined as the annual decile rankings of the three-year
average of total loss recognition timeliness (G-ScoreþC-Score). G-Score is the timeliness of earnings to good news, and C-
Score is the incremental timeliness of earnings to bad news. The estimation details are in Appendix B.CONS CR is the annual decile rankings of the three-year average of the conservatism ratio as developed by Callen et al. (2010).
CONS SKW is the annual decile rankings of the negative of the ratio of the skewness of net income to the skewness of cash flow from
operations, as in Zhang (2008). To obtain the skewness we use rolling windows of five years.
CONS NOACC is the annual decile rankings of the three-year accumulation of non-operating accruals. We adjust our measure by
subtracting the industry mean every year, using the Fama and French industry groups. Next, we multiply the industry-
adjusted non-operating accruals by 1 so that the resulting figure is increasing in conservatism.UnderInvest is a ranked variable that identifies settings in which underinvestment (overinvestment) at the industry-year level is most
likely. The details are described in Section 3.1. UnderInvest takes values from 1 to 0; values closer to 1 (0) indicate settings
in which underinvestment (overinvestment) is most likely at the industry level.FRQ is the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) during the years t5 to
t1, multiplied by 1, and standardized. The model is a regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and
future cash flows plus the change in revenue and PPE. All variables are scaled by average total assets. The model is
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the industry
classification of Fama and French (1997).Institutions is the percentage of a firm's shares held by institutional investors.
Analysts is the number of analysts following a firm.
InvGIM-Score is the measure of anti-takeover protection developed by Gompers et al. (2003), multiplied by 1. When GIM-Score is
missing, InvGIM-Score is assigned the value of 0.
GIM-Score-dum is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if GIM-Score is missing and 0 otherwise.
IA is a continuous variable that measures market-based information asymmetry. It is computed as the average of the
standardized values of BAS, Volatility, and Idiosyncratic risk, described below.
BAS is the bid–ask spread defined as the annual average of daily spread scaled by the midpoint between bid and ask.
Volatility is the standard deviation of one year of daily stock returns.
Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the residual return from a market-model regression of
excess returns on value-weighted market excess returns for 60 months (minimum 24 months).
Young is the negative of the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.
NCR is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm does not have a credit rating in Compustat and 0 otherwise.
Size is the log of the market value of equity.
MTB is the market-to-book value of equity ratio.
Leverage equals short-term plus long-term debt scaled by the market value of equity.
AcceDep is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm uses accelerated depreciation and 0 otherwise.
StdCFO is the firm-specific standard deviation of the cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets, for years t5 to t1,
as a percentage.
StdSales is the firm-specific standard deviation of annual sales deflated by average total assets, for years t5 to t1, as a
percentage.
StdInvestment is the firm-specific standard deviation of annual Investment for years t5 to t1.
Z-Score is a measure of bankruptcy risk defined in Biddle and Hilary (2006) and is based on the methodology of Altman (1968).14
Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets, as a percentage.
Ind-Cap-Struc is the mean of capital structure for firms in the same SIC three-digit industry group, where capital structure is the ratio of
long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity.
CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to average sales.
Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid dividends and 0 otherwise.
OperCycle is the log of receivables to sales plus inventory to COGS multiplied by 360.
InvCycle is a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle defined as depreciation expense scaled by lagged total assets,
as a percentage.
Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise.
Slack is the ratio of cash to net property, plant, and equipment, as a percentage.
Ret is the annual stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding 12-monthly CRSP stock returns ending at the fiscal-
year end.
ROA equals pretax income plus interest expense scaled by lagged total assets, as a percentage.
Mean (ROAtþ1ROAtþ2
ROAtþ3)is the three-year average of ROAtþ1, ROAtþ2, ROAtþ3, in percentage terms.Volatility Fut. ROA is the standard deviation of the future ROA, measured over the period tþ1 to tþ5, and adjusted by subtracting the
industry-year mean. Industry is defined as in Fama and French (1997).Volatility Past ROA is the standard deviation of the past ROA, measured over the period t4 to t, and adjusted by subtracting the industry-
year mean. Industry is defined as in Fama and French (1997).Appendix B
B.1. Estimation details of the conservatism proxies
B.1.1. Conservatism proxy (CONS) of Khan and Watts (2009)
Our main proxy for conservatism, CONS, is based on Khan and Watts (2009). It is defined as the annual decile rankings of
the three year average (years t, t 1, and t 2) of total loss recognition timeliness (G ScoreþC Score). G Score is the
timeliness of earnings to good news, and C Score is the incremental timeliness of earnings to bad news. In building their
proxy, Khan and Watts draw from the cross sectional specification of Basu (1997), which is as follows:
Earnj ¼ β0þβ1 Negjþβ2 Retjþβ3 Negj Retjþεj ðB1Þ
where Earn is earnings; Ret is returns (a measure of news); and Neg is a dummy variable that equals 1 when Ret is negative
and 0 otherwise. In Eq. (B1) above, β2 is the good news timeliness measure, and β3 is the incremental timeliness of earnings
to bad news (over good news). The total timeliness of bad news is (β2þβ3). Khan and Watts modify this model to obtain a
firm level proxy for conservatism by adding up an annual measure of the timeliness of earnings to good news (G Score) and
a measure of the incremental timeliness of bad news with respect to good news (C Score), which they define as follows:
G Score¼ β2 ¼ m1þm2 Sizejþm3 MTBjþm4 Leveragej ðB2Þ
C Score¼ β3 ¼ λ1þλ2 Sizejþλ3 MTBjþλ4 Leveragej ðB3Þ
where mi and λi (i¼1 4) are estimated using annual cross sectional regressions, by substituting Eqs. (B2) and (B3) into (B1).
Thus they are constant across firms but vary over time. C Score and G Score also vary across firms through cross sectional
variation in the firm's characteristics (Size, MTB and Leverage). The annual cross section model used is as follows:
Earnj ¼ β0þβ1 NegjþRetj m1þm2 Sizejþm3 MTBjþm4 Leveragej
 
þNegj Retj λ1þλ2 Sizejþλ3 MTBjþλ4 Leveragej
 
þðδ1 Sizejþδ2 MTBj
þδ3 Leveragejþδ4 Negj Sizejþδ5 Negj MTBjþδ6 Negj LeveragejÞþεj ðB4Þ
where Earn is net income before extraordinary items, scaled by the lagged market value of equity; Ret is the annual stock
rate of return of the firm, measured by compounding 12 monthly CRSP stock returns ending at the fiscal year end; Size is
the log of the market value of equity; MTB is the market to book value of equity ratio; Leverage equals short term plus long
term debt scaled by the market value of equity. Following Khan and Watts, we delete firm years with a price per share of
less than $1, with negative total assets or book value of equity, and firms in the top and bottom 1% of earnings, returns, size,
market to book ratio, leverage, and depreciation each year.
Variation in CONS captures variations in conservatism. To illustrate how variation in conservatism is associated with
changes in CONS, consider the following: when a conservative firm reduces the value of its assets in response to a bad news
shock, the size (MVE) of the firm decreases, as the market is likely to reflect the asset write downs. Leverage also increases
through a decrease in the denominator of the debt to assets or equity ratio because the firm does not instantaneously adjust
its debt structure (Ball et al., 1976). MTB, a proxy for growth opportunities, is also likely to decrease because of the negative
shock. The decreases in size and MTB and the increase in leverage increase CONS via Eq. (B3), the incremental timeliness of
bad news with respect to good news, because coefficients λ2 and λ3 are negative and coefficient λ4 is positive. The empirical15
evidence in Ettredge et al. (2012) and Jayaraman (2012) confirms that the Khan and Watts proxy captures variation in
conservatism at the firm's level.
B.1.2. Evidence on the correlation between the conservatism proxies and their association with the determinants of conservatism
We use a number of conservatism proxies in our robustness checks. In particular, and aside from CONS as described
above, we also use a proxy based on the conservatism ratio described in Callen et al. (2010) (CONS¼CR), as well as the
annual decile rankings of the negative of the ratio of the skewness of net income to the skewness of cash flow from
operations (CONS¼SKW) and the annual decile rankings of the three year accumulation of non operating accruals
(CONS¼NOACC).
In this appendix, we provide evidence on the correlations between the different proxies used in the paper (Panel A), and
we also show the results obtained when we regress our conservatism proxies on the three determinants of conservatism:
Size, MTB, and Leverage (Panel B).
Panel A shows that the correlations among raw values of the four conservatism proxies are low and insignificant,
probably indicating that they capture different dimensions of conservatism. In particular, CONS¼SKW and CONS¼NOACC
capture aggregate conservatism (both conditional and unconditional).
In panel B, whenwe regress the annual decile rankings of the four conservatism proxies on their economic determinants,
we find evidence that all four proxies are positively and significantly associated with Leverage, as expected. Also, the
association with MTB is negative in all cases except for CONS¼NOACC. Finally, the association with Size is significant in all
cases but only negative for CONS¼K&W.16Panel A: Correlations among conservatism proxies, Size, MTB, and Leverage
Pearson correlations K&W CR SKW NOACC Size MTBCONS K&W 1.00
CONS CR 0.00 1.00
CONS SKW 0.01 0.02 1.00
CONS NOACC 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
Size 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.02 1.00
MTB 0.42 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.28 1.00
Leverage 0.68 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.30Panel B: Regression of conservatism proxies on Size, MTB and LeverageCONS K&W CONS CR CONS SKW CONS NOACCExpected Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
sign t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-StatLeverage þ 0.903nnn 0.147nnn 0.053n 0.320nnn
6.39 3.47 2.40 5.37MTB  0.177nnn 0.002 0.040nnn 0.016
3.46 0.07 5.63 1.00Size  1.040nnn 0.122nnn 0.048nnn 0.048nn
24.62 4.64 6.26 1.97Constant 11.445nnn 4.746nnn 5.320nnn 5.055nnn50.60 34.15 127.60 40.622R 0.715 0.007 0.002 0.006
N. obs. 41,626 20,252 41,114 40,943The sample covers the period 1990–2007. CONS K&W is the annual decile rankings of the three-year average of the firm-year measure of conservatism
constructed by Khan and Watts (2009). CONS CR is the annual decile rankings of the three-year average of the conservatism ratio as developed by Callen
et al. (2010) and modified as described in the text. CONS SKW is the annual decile rankings of the negative of the ratio of the skewness of net income to
the skewness of cash flow from operations, using rolling windows of five years. CONS NOACC is the annual decile rankings of the three-year accumulation
of non-operating accruals. We subtract the industry mean every year, using the Fama and French industry groups. Next, we multiply the industry-adjusted
non-operating accruals by 1 so that the resulting figure is increasing in conservatism. In all four cases, higher values of CONS are associated with higher
conservatism. Leverage equals short-term plus long-term debt scaled by the market value of equity. MTB is the market-to-book value of the equity ratio.
Size is the log of the market value of equity. Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted using a cluster at the firm and year level. The
symbols nnn, nn, and n denote two-sided significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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